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Abstract
There are good reasons to believe that we are classical algorithms run
on (effectively) classical machines. However, the fact that a physical state
of a system in a universe described by a classical deterministic model
doesn’t contain any information about the model’s evolution laws, gives
rise to deep philosophical paradoxes with this picture of what we are. We
explain these paradoxes in detail and show that they can be resolved once
we take into account that in the real world, classical behavior arises as a
result of decoherence. We then show that this solution naturally leads to
a variant of the idea of a mathematical multiverse, originally proposed by
Tegmark.
1 Introduction
According to the computationalist theory of the mind, conscious experiences are
identified with computational states of algorithms [1, 2]. This view is the logical
conclusion one arrives at if one assumes that physics applies to everything, in-
cluding us. One can then still question if classical computation can fully explain
conscious experiences generated by the brain. Arguments have been put forward
that suggest that quantum computing may play an important role in some brain
processes [3]. However, Tegmark has shown that the relevant time scale for el-
ementary information processing events in the brain to unfold, is many orders
of magnitude larger than the time it takes for superpositions of such processes
to decohere [4]. This means that whatever human consciousness is, it has to be
identified with the running of certain classical algorithms. Any randomness due
to quantum mechanics manifests itself in a purely classical way (i.e. without
leading to interference phenomena or violations of Bell’s inequalities) and can
thus always be modeled by pseudo-random generators [4].
Nevertheless, computationalism has been vigorously attacked by some philoso-
phers on many different grounds [2]. Many of the criticisms boil down to com-
putationalism not being compatible with some prior assumptions made about
consciousness. In this article we won’t consider such arguments. We will assume
the computationalist point of view that conscious experience only depends on
the computational state of an algorithm, and is completely independent of the
physical implementation. However, even within this framework, some of the
criticisms remain relevant. A particularly interesting argument against compu-
tationalism is based on the existence of mappings of machine states to the states
of trivial systems [5].
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Consider a simulation of a person in a virtual environment such that the
whole evolution of the system is deterministic. A simulation over some finite
time interval will simply cause the system to evolve through some finite number
of predetermined states. This means that this system behaves just like any
trivial system that also evolves through at least the same number of different
states, say a clock with a number of independent dials that run at different
rates. Why then would such a trivial system not generate the same subjective
experiences? Clearly the time evolutions of the two systems can be mapped
onto each other. Nevertheless, the two systems are not the same, but to see this
one has to consider a range of different initial conditions. Only then can one
see that the computer is actually performing non-trivial computations, while
the clock is just running in the same trivial way [6]. No one to one mapping
between the states of the systems is possible when one considers counterfactual
initial conditions.
While it is a compelling argument that counterfactuals must be considered
to see if a computation is really being implemented by a system, one still has
to deal with the fact that counterfactuals are events that, by definition, did not
happen. To see that this is not just a philosophical problem with no relevance
to physics, we can reformulate it into one where the same paradox manifests
itself as ambiguities in probabilities of experimental outcomes [7]. Suppose we
run three simultaneous simulations of a person, one in a virtual room with white
walls and two simulations in a virtual room with black walls. The latter two
simulations are exactly identical; the processors will behave in exactly the same
way. The probability that the person finds himself in the black room would
seem to be 2/3. However, since the two processors rendering the person in the
black room are performing identical operations, we could imagine replacing one
processor by a ”dummy processor” that simply copies whatever the other one
is doing. Since no real computations are performed by the dummy processor,
we should expect that the probabilities are now 1/2. In terms of counterfactu-
als, we can say that when both processors are working independently, one can
choose independent input for both systems. But then a similar objection can
be made as in the previous case: In a situation where both processors are going
to perform identical computations, why does it matter if both processors can
function correctly when fed different input?
The fundamental problem these paradoxes point to is that in classical deter-
ministic models, the information about the evolution laws of the system is not
present in the physical states of the system itself. While this poses no problems
when doing computations in terms of the physical states, it becomes a problem
when we imagine that an observer is present in a universe described by such
deterministic laws and we attempt to compute the probabilities of certain ob-
servations. However, we’ve only seen that this is a problem for a hypothetical
world that is exactly described by a classical deterministic model. While the
real world at the macro-level is effectively classical in the sense that probabili-
ties behave in a classical way, i.e. without exhibiting interference or violations of
Bell’s inequalities, the reason why the above paradoxes arise has nothing to do
with classicality in this sense. It thus makes sense to re-examine the paradoxes
in a real world setting.
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2 Classical algorithms run on real machines
The world we live in is described by quantum mechanics. This means that even
macroscopic machines running classical algorithms are described by quantum
mechanics. The classical behavior of such a machine is explained by decoherence:
On a time scale that is much smaller than the time needed to perform an
elementary computational step, any superposition of machine states would have
decohered; in fact such superpositions won’t arise due to fast decoherence in
the first place. As mentioned in the previous section, we note that Tegmark has
shown that this picture is adequate for the human brain [4].
The computational state a classical machine is in, can be specified by a bit
string b. The quantum states corresponding to these bit strings, which we’ll
denote as |b〉 , form a subset of the pointer basis. Normalized states of the
universe containing the machine can be denoted as
|ψ〉 =
∑
b
|b〉 ⊗ |E(b)〉 (1)
where |E(b)〉 denotes the unnormalized states of the environment which we
define as all the degrees of freedom that are not described by the bit string.
We assume that all the environmental states |E(b)〉 describe the machine run-
ning the same algorithm reliably; under the time evolution according to the
Schro¨dinger equation, the bit string changes after some time step according to
the algorithm that the machine is supposed to be running.
The states |E(b)〉 are orthogonal and thus contain perfect information about
the computational state. In fact, the whole computational history of the ma-
chine will be contained in the states |E(b)〉 . In the Copenhagen and Consistent
Histories interpretations, one assumes that only one term of (1) refers to the
real world. Here we won’t make any such assumptions, and work within the
Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) [8].
The state (1) seems to have a straightforward interpretation: According to
the Born rule, the probability for the observer generated by the machine to find
herself in the computational state b should be |〈E(b)|E(b)〉|2. However, we
would then assume that an observer with some definite experience is described
by a single term of (1). The only assumption about consciousness we’ll make
in this article is that the opposite is true: A definite conscious experience is
consistent with an astronomically large number of computational states. We can
be confident that this must be the case for at least us. A huge amount of brain
processes are going on at any given moment. Many of these processes implement
pattern recognition algorithms which leads to awareness of the patterns at the
expense of awareness of the many parts that make up the patterns [9]. Since the
patterns will have a significant entropy in terms of the computational states,
this leads to the conclusion that any particular state of consciousness should be
consistent with a large number of computational states.
We can now see how this solves the paradox on counterfactuals discussed in
the previous section. An observer with a definite experience is represented by
an entangled state of the form (1), where the summation is over many computa-
tional states. Since the environmental states contain the complete information
about the computational history, we can read such an entangled state as a table
that specifies the output of the algorithm as a function of the input. The state
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of the observer thus (partially) specifies the algorithm that generates the ob-
server. Note that interpreting the entangled state in this way is not an ad hoc
choice. Compare this to writing down a table on paper specifying each output
corresponding to each input. This does not single out the correct interpretation
of whatever is written as the algorithm. We may write in the caption how to
interpret the table, but whatever is written there is not a law of physics and
can thus be ignored.
In contrast, the entangled state (1) automatically implies that the compo-
nents of the state are correlated. This correlation does not define the algorithm
fully, as the summation over the computational states in the entangled state is
only over a restricted set of states that are consistent with whatever the observer
is aware of. It is then natural to assume that ”awareness” is such a correlation.
Quantum mechanics allows for such correlations to exist in the form of entan-
gled states at any particular moment, while within classical mechanics there is
no room for this.
One obvious objection against this picture can be raised: Since the compu-
tational states are macroscopic, one can imagine a machine looking at itself and
simply observing its own parts. So, why won’t the machine be able to observe
its own computational state? To answer this, we note that the information the
machine has about the external world makes up part of the computational state,
therefore the machine cannot have enough memory to store the exact compu-
tational state it is in. Moreover, as explained above, it is reasonable to assume
that whatever we are aware of, are patterns in the raw information present in
the brain, so the number of different states of conscious experiences should be
far less than the number of states the memory can encode. We can still imagine
a ”super-observer” with a memory capacity that is vastly larger than that of the
machine that can observe the precise computational state of the machine, but
there is then no way that the observation can be communicated to the machine.
3 A mathematical multiverse?
The main conclusion we’ve reached is based on a rather trivial observation. We
can take any entangled state, like the following two-qubit state:
1√
2
[|0〉 ⊗ |0〉 + |1〉 ⊗ |1〉 ] (2)
and then say that this represents a classical algorithm or a mathematical state-
ment. In this case, we can read the state as saying that the second qubit is in
the state |x〉 , if and only if the first qubit is in the state |x〉 . Mathematical
statements can thus be said to have objective existence when they are realized
in the form of such entangled states. In particular, you are that particular al-
gorithm that your brain is running, and this exists in the form of an entangled
state.
The Hamiltonian that determines the dynamics plays a redundant role in
this picture. Since we are always localized in time at some given moment, the
information we have about the dynamics must be contained in the physical state
of the universe at any given time. This suggests that the dynamics may not play
the fundamental role in physics as one commonly assumes. The conventional
picture may actually not work; it has been hard to find a solution to the so-called
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Boltzmann brain problem: Contrary to our observations, typical observers in the
universe are predicted to arise randomly due to fluctuations and will thus have
awareness of false information. But if we simply ignore this problem and focus
on a sector containing a normal observer and apply the time evolution operator
to predict the probabilities of outcomes of experiments, then no problems occur.
It thus makes sense to throw away the redundancy to prevent it from mak-
ing trouble. We can do this by postulating the existence of a mathematical
multiverse, similar to a proposal by Tegmark [10]. The difference is that what
we postulate is simply a set of all possible mathematical statements defining
functions or algorithms. Unlike Tegmark, we don’t take each element of the
ensemble to be a model of a universe in the conventional sense, i.e. one which
evolves according to some laws. Such laws contain redundant information that
we don’t want. The elements of the ensemble can be formally represented by
quantum states, as explained above. For a given observer in some conscious
state, there will be many elements that can represent her. One can e.g. append
extra qubits to the element, without affecting the interpretation of the algorithm
defining the observer.
One then needs to specify a measure over the ensemble. This fixes a proba-
bility distribution over the possible observed laws of physics for every observer
in the ensemble. Obviously, the measure must be larger for elements contain-
ing information that are compatible with living in a lawful universe. One way
to express this mathematically is to say that the information contained in the
element must be highly compressible. One can consider the size of the small-
est quantum algorithm that can generate the element starting from a reference
state (e.g. the state in which all qubits initialized to zero, what matters is that
this reference state can be specified with a few bits). To get rid of Boltzmann
brain observers, one also needs to take into account the number of steps the
algorithm needs to be applied. So, what seems to matter is the overall compu-
tational complexity of the unitary map from the reference state to the target
state.
4 Discussion
We have argued that the very mechanism that explains classical behavior of
macroscopic systems, i.e. decoherence, also solves the paradox of counterfactu-
als in computationalism. The fact that one can describe macroscopic phenomena
using classical mechanics, doesn’t make these phenomena classical in the sense
that all quantum correlations have magically disappeared. In reality, the macro-
scopic degrees of freedom get entangled with an astronomically large number
of microscopic degrees of freedom, making the macroscopic degrees of freedom
appear to behave in a classical way. It is then possible to describe these degrees
of freedom using a classical model in which one pretends that the macroscopic
degrees of freedom live in a classical phase-space. But this phase-space is un-
physical; the real system is still described by a quantum mechanical state vector
which in general describes a complicated entangled state.
We have then argued that this suggests that instead of a physical universe
that evolves according to some laws, all that really exists is a mathematical
multiverse, whose elements are classical algorithms. These algorithms can be
represented formally as quantum states. A measure needs to be defined over
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this multiverse to get useful physics out of this. We’ve argued that the measure
of an element should depend on the computational complexity of the unitary
map that generates the element from a reference state.
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